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Abstract
Many specic models have been proposed to study evolutionary game dynamics
in structured populations, but most analytical results so far describe the competition
of only two strategies. Here we derive a general result that holds for any number of
strategies, for a large class of population structures under weak selection. We show
that for the purpose of strategy selection any evolutionary process can be characterized
by two key parameters that are coecients in a linear inequality containing the payo
values. These structural coecients, 1 and 2, depend on the particular process that
is being studied, but not on the number of strategies, n, nor on the payo matrix.
For calculating these structural coecients one has to investigate games with three
strategies, but more are not needed. Therefore, n = 3 is the general case. Our main
result has a geometric interpretation: strategy selection is determined by the sum
of two terms, the rst one describing competition on the edges of the simplex, the
second one in the center. Our formula includes all known weak selection criteria of
evolutionary games as special cases. As a specic example we calculate games on sets
and explore the synergistic interaction between direct reciprocity and spatial selection.
We show that for certain parameter values both repetition and space are needed to
promote evolution of cooperation.
Evolutionary games arise whenever the tness of individuals is not constant, but depends on
the relative abundance of strategies in the population [1-7]. Evolutionary game theory is a general
1theoretical framework that can be used to study many biological problems including host-parasite
interactions, ecosystems, animal behavior, social evolution and human language [8-18]. The tra-
ditional approach of evolutionary game theory uses deterministic dynamics describing innitely
large, well-mixed populations. More recently the framework was expanded to deal with stochastic
dynamics, nite population size and structured populations [19-32].
Here we consider a mutation-selection process acting in a population of nite size. The pop-
ulation structure determines who interacts with whom to accumulate payo and who competes
with whom for reproduction. Individuals adopt one of n strategies. The payo for an interaction
between any two strategies is given by the nn payo matrix A = [aij]. The rate of reproduction
is proportional to payo: individuals that accumulate higher payo are more likely to reproduce.
Reproduction is subject to symmetric mutation: with probability 1   u the ospring inherits the
strategy of the parent, but with probability u a random strategy is chosen. Our process leads to
a stationary distribution characterizing the mutation-selection equilibrium. Important questions
are: what is the average frequency of a strategy in the stationary distribution? which strategies
are more abundant than others?
In order to make progress, we consider the limit of weak selection. One way to obtain this
limit is as follows: the rate of reproduction of each individual is proportional to 1+wPayo, where
w is a constant that measures the intensity of selection; the limit of weak selection is then given
by w ! 0. Weak selection is not an unnatural situation; it can arise in dierent ways: (i) payo
dierences are small; (ii) strategies are similar; (iii) individuals are confused about payos when
updating their strategies; in such situations, the particular game makes only a small contribution
to the overall reproductive success of an individual.
For weak selection, all strategies have roughly the same average frequency, 1=n, in the station-
ary distribution. A strategy is favored by selection, if its average frequency is greater than 1=n.
Otherwise it is opposed by selection. Our main result is the following: given some mild assumptions
(specied in the Supporting Information, SI) strategy k is favored by selection if
(1akk +  ak    ak   1 a) + 2( ak    a) > 0 (1)
Here  a = (1=n)
Pn
i=1 aii is the average payo when both individuals use the same strategy;
 ak = (1=n)
Pn
i=1 aki is the average payo of strategy k;  ak = (1=n)
Pn
i=1 aik is the average
2payo when playing against strategy k; and  a = (1=n2)
Pn
i=1
Pn
j=1 aij is the average payo in the
population. The parameters 1 and 2 are structural coecients which need to be calculated for
the specic evolutionary process that is investigated. These parameters depend on the population
structure, the update rule, the mutation rate, but they do not depend on the number of strategies
nor on the entries of the payo matrix.
How can we interpret this result? Let xi denote the frequency of strategy i. The conguration
of the population (just in terms of frequencies of strategies) is given by a point in the simplex Sn,
which is dened by
Pn
i=1 xi = 1. The vertices of the simplex correspond to population states where
only one strategy is present. The edges of the simplex correspond to states where two strategies
are present. In the interior of the simplex all strategies are present. Inequality (1) is the sum of
two terms, both of which are linear in the payo values. The rst term, 1akk +  ak    ak  1 a,
describes competition on the edges of the simplex that include strategy k (see Fig 1a). In particular,
it is an average over all pairwise comparisons between strategy k and each other strategy, weighted
by the structural coecient, 1. The second term, 2( ak    a), evaluates the competition between
strategy k and all other strategies in the center of the simplex, where all strategies have the same
frequency, 1=n (see Fig 1b).
Therefore, the surprising implication of our main result (1) is that strategy selection (in a
mutation-selection process in a structured population) is simply the sum of two competition terms,
one that is evaluated on the edges of the simplex and the other one in the center of the simplex. The
simplicity of this result is surprising because an evolutionary process in a structured population
has a very large number of possible states; to describe a particular state it is not enough to list the
frequencies of strategies but one also has to specify the population structure.
Further intuition for our main result is provided by the concept of risk-dominance. The classical
notion of risk-dominance for a game with two strategies in a well-mixed population is: strategy i is
risk-dominant over strategy j if aii+aij > aji+ajj. If i and j are engaged in a coordination game,
given by aii > aji and ajj > aij, then the risk-dominant strategy has the bigger basin of attraction.
In a structured population the risk-dominance condition is modied to aii+aij > aji+ajj, where
 is the structural coecient [31]. Therefore, the rst term in inequality (1) represents the average
over all pairwise risk-dominance comparisons between strategy k and each other strategy (taking
into account population structure). The second term in inequality (1) measures the risk-dominance
3of strategy k when simultaneously compared to all other strategies in a well-mixed population; it
is the generalization of the concept of risk-dominance to multiple strategies,  ak >  a.
In the Supporting Information we show that the structural coecients, 1 and 2, do not
depend on the number of strategies. In order to calculate 1 and 2 for any particular evolutionary
process, we need to consider games with n = 3 strategies. More than three strategies are not
needed. Therefore, n = 3 is the general case. An important practical implication of our result
is the following: if we want to calculate the competition of multiple strategies in a structured
population for weak selection but any mutation rate, then all we have to do is to calculate two
parameters, 1 and 2. This can be done for a very simple payo matrix and n = 3 strategies.
Once 1 and 2 are known they can be applied to any payo matrix and any number of strategies.
For n = 2 strategies, inequality (1) leads to (a11   a22)(21 + 2) + (a12   a21)(2 + 2) > 0. If
2 + 2 6= 0, we obtain the well known condition a11 + a12 > a21 + a22 with  = (21 + 2)=(2 +
2). Many  values have been calculated characterizing evolutionary games with two strategies in
structured populations [31].
For a large, well-mixed population we know that 1 = 1 and 2 =  where  = Nu is the
product of population size and mutation rate [30]. Therefore, if the mutation rate is low,  ! 0,
then the evolutionary success of a strategy is determined by average pair-wise risk dominance,
akk +  ak    ak    a. If the mutation rate is high,  ! 1, then the evolutionary success depends
on risk dominance,  ak    a.
For any population structure, we can show that low mutation,  ! 0, implies 2 ! 0. Therefore,
in the limit of low mutation, the condition for strategy k to be selected becomes 0akk +  ak >
 ak +0 a where 0 is the low mutation limit of the structure coecient  = (21 +2)=(2+2).
Hence, for low mutation it suces to study 2-strategy games, and all known  results [31] carry
over to the multiple strategy case.
In the limit of high mutation,  ! 1, we conjecture (but can not prove) that, for a large class
of processes, 2 becomes much larger than 1 and much larger than 1. In that case the selection
condition is simply risk dominance,  ak    a, which is also the high mutation limit for a well-mixed
population. Thus, if the mutation rate is large enough then the eect of population structure on
strategy selection is destroyed.
In the Supporting Information we give a computational formula for how to calculate 1 and 2
4for any process with global updating (which means all individuals compete globally for reproduc-
tion).
Let us now study a specic evolutionary process, where the individuals of a population of size
N are distributed over M sets [32]. These sets can be geographic islands, social institutions or
tags [32-35]. At any one time each individual belongs to one set and adopts one of n strategies.
Individuals interact with others in the same set and thereby obtain payo. Individuals reproduce
proportional to payo. Ospring inherit their parent's strategy, subject to a strategy mutation
rate, u, and their parent's set, subject to a set mutation rate, v. We use rescaled mutation rates
 = Nu and  = Nv. In the Supporting Information we calculate 1 and 2 for this process and
provide analytic results for large population size, N, but for any number of sets, M, and for any
mutation rates. For large  we obtain 1  M(1+)=(M +) and 2  . Note that large strategy
mutation rate, , destroys the eect of population structure, as expected.
In Figure 2, we show the dependency of 1 and 2 on the strategy mutation rate, . We choose
M = 100 sets and show panels for dierent values of the set mutation rate, . For  ! 0 and  ! 1
we obtain the same gure, because both cases correspond to a well-mixed population. There exists
a particular strategy mutation rate, , for which 1 = 2. For  <  structural eects prevail
over mutation, because 1 > 2 . For  >  mutation destroys the eect of population structure,
because 1 < 2 . For large M, the critical mutation rate is given by   1 + .
We now use these results to study a particular game on sets. Our game has three strategies,
always cooperate (AllC), always defect (AllD) and tit-for-tat (TFT), and is meant to describe
the essential problem of evolution of cooperation under direct reciprocity. We assume there are
repeated interactions between any two players subject to a certain continuation probability; the
average number of rounds is given by m. In any one round, cooperation has a cost, c, and yields
benet, b, for the other player, where b > c > 0. Defection has no cost and yields no benet. We
use average payo per round to denote the entries of the payo matrix:
0
B B
B
@
AllC AllD TFT
AllC b   c  c b   c
AllD b 0 b=m
TFT b   c  c=m b   c
1
C C
C
A
(2)
5AllD is the only strict Nash equilibrium. If b   c  b=m then TFT is a Nash equilibrium, but
not an evolutionarily stable strategy.
We are interested in calculating the condition for natural selection to oppose AllD, which means
that its frequency is less than 1=3 in the stationary distribution. We observe that selection opposes
AllD for small strategy mutation rates and intermediate set mutation rates (Fig 3). For high
strategy mutation rate and for low or high set mutation rate the structure behaves like a well-
mixed population, which is detrimental to cooperation. There is an optimum set mutation rate
which maximally supports evolution of cooperation [32].
Next we study how the condition for selecting against AllD depends on repetition and structure
(Fig 4). We make the following observations. For b=c < 3, even if the game is innitely repeated,
m ! 1, we still need population structure to oppose AllD. In this parameter region repetition
alone is not enough. For b=c < 1+(+3)=((+2)), even if there are innitely many sets (M ! 1),
we still need repetition to oppose AllD. Hence, for certain parameter choices both repetition and
spatial structure must work together to promote evolution of cooperation [36,37]. This example
demonstrates the need for synergistic interactions between various mechanisms for the evolution of
cooperation [38]. In particular it is of interest that unless the benet-to-cost ratio is substantial,
b=c > 3, repetition alone does not provide enough selection pressure to oppose AllD.
In summary, we have derived a simple, general condition which characterizes strategy selection,
if multiple strategies compete in a structured population under weak selection. The condition is
linear in the payo values and includes two structural coecients, 1 and 2, which depend on the
population structure, update rule, mutation rates, but do not depend on the number of strategies
nor on the entries of the payo matrix. The condition is a simple sum of two terms: one describes
competition on the edges of the simplex and the other one in the center. Future research directions
suggested by this result include: (i) a classication of population structures and update rules based
on the two structural parameters; (ii) numerical and analytic explorations of how the weak selection
result carries over to stronger selection intensities in specic cases; (iii) extending our theory from
pairwise interactions to multi-player games. Finally our general result can be used to guide the
exploration of many specic evolutionary processes.
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Figure legends
Figure 1. Our main result has a simple geometric interpretation, which is illustrated here for the
case of n = 3 strategies. (a) The rst term of inequality (1) describes competition on the edges
of the simplex. (b) The second term of inequality (1) describes competition in the center of the
simplex. In general, the selective criterion for strategy 1 is the sum of the two terms.
Figure 2. The dependency of 1 and 2 on the strategy mutation rate, . We choose M = 100 sets
and show panels for dierent values of the set mutation rate: (a)  = 0; (b)  = 3; (c)  = 10; (d)
 = 100; (e)  = 1000. We observe that 2  . For  ! 0 and  ! 1 we obtain the same gure,
because both cases correspond to a well-mixed population. For a particular strategy mutation rate,
, we have 1 = 2. For  <  structural eects prevail over mutation, because 1 > 2 . For
 >  mutation destroys the eect of population structure, because 1 < 2 .
Figure 3. The eect of strategy and set mutations on the condition to select against AllD.
Selection opposes AllD for small strategy mutation rates and intermediate set mutation rates. For
high strategy mutation rate and for low and high set mutation rate the structure behaves like a
well-mixed population. There is an optimum set mutation rate. Parameters: b = 2, c = 1, m = 7,
M = 8.
9Figure 4. The synergistic interaction of direct reciprocity and spatial selection. For certain
parameter choices neither repetition nor structure alone can select against AllD. (a) c = 1, b = 3,
 = 0,  = 0:5. Either repetition or structure are sucient. (b) c = 1, b = 2,  = 0,  = 5. A
minimum number of sets is needed. (c) c = 1, b = 3,  = 0,  = 0:05. A minimum number of
rounds is needed. (d) c = 1, b = 2,  = 0,  = 0:5. Both a minimum number of rounds and a
minimum number of sets are needed to select against AllD.
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